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A First Amendment Right of Access
to the Courts for Indigents
In our legal system, the meritorious claims of indigents are fre-
quently not adjudicated, much less vindicated, because of governmen-
tally-imposed costs of litigation. In some jurisdictions, relief from filing
fees is available through the mechanism of proceeding in forma pai-
peris.1 Many states, however, make no such provision, and those that
do frequently waive court fees only in certain actions. Moreover, there
are other expenses, such as bond and notice costs, which confront many
litigants and for which relief is generally unavailable.2
Relying on principles of due process and equal protection, the
Supreme Court has already made tentative steps toward a right of
judicial access for indigents. The scope of these decisions is limited,
however, and the doctrines they invoke raise considerable difficulties.
This Note suggests that a more comprehensive and workable theory
of access may be developed on the basis of the First Amendment.3
I. Due Process and Access
Any discussion of the access rights of indigents must begin with
Boddie v. Connecticut,4 where the Supreme Court struck down filing
fees in divorce actions as a violation of due process. The majority
opinion by Justice Harlan rested on two interlocking principles: (1)
that the marriage institution is "fundamental," and (2) that the state
required the plaintiffs to "resort to the judicial process" for the ad-
justment of this fundamental relationship. Since access to the court
was "the exclusive precondition" for divorce, the Court found that
"[r]esort to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary
in a realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend
1. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970). See generally Silverstein, Wai, er of Court Costs
and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VAL. L. REv. 210 33-36
(1967).
2. Silverstein, supra note 1, at 35-36.
3. Previous academic comment has, like the courts, focused on issues of due process
and equal protection. See, e.g., Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due
Process Standards, and the Inaigent's ]tight of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REV.
223 (1970); Willging, Financial Barriers and Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEo.
L.J. 253 (1968); Note, Indigent Access to Civil Courts: The Tiger Is at the Cates, 26 VND.
L. REv. 25 (1973); Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 Gro.
L.J. 516 (1968).
4. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
5. Id. at 383.
6. Id.
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his interests in court," 7 and that consequently the plaintiffs were en-
titled to the same rights accorded defendants in more traditional due
process cases. As the state could advance no "sufficient countervailing
interest,"8 the Court refused to allow such rights to be frustrated by a
filing fee.
Although Boddie represents a significant expansion of the right of
access for the indigent plaintiff, its doctrinal approach raises substan-
tial problems. First, the Court offers no criteria for determining which
interests are fundamental under its due process theory; the opinion
fails to explain why marriage is any more important than a number
of other interests, such as housing, education, or employment.0 As Jus-
tice Douglas noted in his concurrence, the majority opinion is thus
reminiscent of the discredited doctrine of substantive due process.10
It is also difficult to discern appropriate limits for the Court's "ex-
clusive precondition" test. As Justice Brennan argued in his concur-
rence, the state always has the "ultimate monopoly of all judicial proc-
ess and attendant enforcement machinery,"" and thus may be the only
effective remedy for an individual seeking to enforce virtually any
right. Indeed, it seems artificial to confine such a rationale to judicial
access, since many administrative agencies exercise the same monopoly
in dispensing vital services or granting licenses for various activities.
Thus, the same logic that prohibits fees for divorce actions could apply
as well to those charged for marriage licenses.
Recently, in holding in United States v. Kras12 that there is no con-
stitutional right to a free discharge in bankruptcy, the Court made
clear that it will take a narrow view of the access right developed in
Boddie.13 The Court's opinion illustrates the necessity for drawing
7. Id. at 376-77.
8. Id. at 380-81.
9. Even Mr. Justice Black, who dissented in Boddie, later remarked that its holding
could not be restricted to the marriage right. He concluded:
In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on only one
crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the United States and each of the States
belong to the people of this country and that no person can be denied access to
those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot pay a fee, finance a
bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney .... I believe there can be no
doubt that this country can afford to provide court costs and lawyers to Americans
who are now barred by their poverty from resort to the law for resolution of their
disputes.
Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw, 402 U.S. 954, 955-56 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
10. 401 U.S. at 384-85 (Douglas, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 387 (Brennan, J., concurring).
12. 93 S. Ct. 631 (1973).
13. Id. at 636-38. Even the Kras dissenters appear to approve the Boddie test, dis-
agreeing with the majority only with respect to its application. Id. at 644 (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). The Court has only once indicated a willingness to enlarge Boddie's scope,
and there only by indirection. Frederick v. Schwartz, 402 U.S. 937 (1971), vacating and
remanding 296 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Conn. 1969) (challenge to filing fees in appeals from
welfare "fair hearings"). But see Ortwein v. Schwab, 41 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. March 5, 1973).
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what are essentially arbitrary distinctions in applying the due process
approach. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion stated that a discharge
in bankruptcy did "not rise to the same constitutional level" as a
divorce decree14 and that there was no exclusive governmental control
over the "establishment, enforcement, or dissolution of debts."' 3 While
these distinctions may be less than compelling,'0 Kras, and not Boddie,
is currently favored by the Court. In Ortwein v. Schwab'7 the Court
extended the rationale of Kras in upholding an Oregon filing fee of
$25 for judicial appeals from rulings of the state welfare department.
The Court, noting that in Kras it had already "emphasized the special
nature of the marital relationship"18 protected in Boddie, argued that
old-age assistance was of "far less constitutional significance." 10 Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall each argued in separate dis-
sents that Boddie and not Kras should have controlled.2 0
II. Equal Protection and Access
The Equal Protection Clause may seem a more appropriate safe-
guard for the rights of the indigent plaintiff than the due process
rationale of Boddie. The Court has already demonstrated its willing-
ness to invalidate financial barriers that discriminate against the poor
when fundamental interests are at stake.2' But despite dicta in some
older cases that access to the courts is central to the notion of equal
protection,22 the Court has yet to hold that a plaintiff's right to his
day in court is of such a fundamental character as to make de facto
wealth discriminations invalid.2 3
14. 93 S. Ct. 631, 638.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 643 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
17. 41 U.S.L.V. 3473 (U.S. March 5, 1973).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 3474-75.
21. The rights thus protected have so far included the right to travel, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elm., 383
U.S. 663 (1966); and the right to present a criminal defense, Gardner v. California, 393
U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (19G7); Draper v. Washington. 372
U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438 (1962); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
22. See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885), where the Court stated that
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to insure:
that all persons . . . should have like access to the courts of the country for the
protection of their persons and property, and the prevention and redress of wrongs,
and the enforcement of contracts ....
23. Nevertheless, there are cases in which the fundamental character of access to the
courts is emphasized in strong terms. Thus, in Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry.. 207
US. 142, 148 (1907) the Court stated in dicta:
The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized
1057
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The Court's decision in Lindsey v. Normet,24 however, suggests that
it may be receptive to such an argument. There the Court struck down,
as a violation of equal protection, another Oregon statute requiring
tenants to post a double bond when appealing an unfavorable judg-
ment in a forcible entry and detainer action. Lindsey ostensibly rests
on the rational basis test of equal protection. 25 Since no such bond was
required in other actions, and since the state could offer no acceptable
rationale for requiring the extra security solely in FED actions, the
statute was held to discriminate arbitrarily against tenants as a class."0
Nevertheless, the opinion suggests a sensitivity to the access rights of
the poor in emphasizing the effect of such statutes on the indigent:
The discrimination against the poor . . . is particularly obvious.
For them, as a practical matter, appeal is foreclosed, no matter
how meritorious their case may be.
2 7
Similarly, in Boddie, both Justices Douglas and Brennan urged an
equal protection rationale as an alternative to the majority's reliance
on due process. Both of their concurrences suggest28 that the "funda-
mental" right of access required for invoking equal protection analysis
can be derived from notions of due process developed in earlier cases
involving defendants.2 9 However, such an approach obviously takes
society, it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of
orderly government. It is one of the highest and most essential privileges of
citizenship ....
24. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
25. Id. at 76-77.
26. The case of Williams v. Shaffer, 222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1037 (1967), had earlier presented a similar issue when the Court was asked to
assess the impact of a single-bond requirement on tenants seeking to arrest a summary
process eviction. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Chief Justice Warren concurred, dis-
sented from the denial of certiorari:
The effect of the security statute is to grant an affluent tenant a hearing and to
deny an indigent tenant a hearing. The ability to obtain a hearing is thus made to
turn upon the tenant's wealth.... [T]he promise of equal justice for all would
be an empty phrase for the poor if the ability to obtain judicial relief were made
to turn on the length of a person's purse.
385 U.S. at 1039.
27. 405 U.S. at 79. In point of fact, the Lindsey appellants were indigents, 402 U.S.
941 (1971) (motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted), who held month.
to-month tenancies, 405 U.S. at 58. A further indication of the Court's concern over
the problem of indigency was its citation of the Griffin line of decisions, see note 21
supra, all of which bottom on wealth discrimination. 405 U.S. at 77.
28. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383-84 (Douglas, J., concurring), id. at 386,
388 (Brennan, J., concurring).
29. [T]his case presents a classic problem of equal protection of the laws. The
question that the Court treats exclusively as one of due process inevitably implicates
considerations of both due process and equal protection. Certainly, there is at issue
the denial of a hearing, a matter for analysis under the Due Process Clause. But
Connecticut does not deny a hearing to everyone in these circumstances; it denies
it only to people who fail to pay certain fees. The validity of this partial denial,
or differentiation in treatment, can be treated as well under the Equal Protection
Clause.
Id. at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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one no further than the majority opinion: It involves the same arbi-
trary determinations of when, and to whom, the due process right
applies.
Thus, the issue remains whether the Court will recognize a funda-
mental access right extending to plaintiffs as well as defendants. The
remainder of this Note will argue that the appropriate basis for such
a right lies not in the Due Process Clause, but rather in the right to
petition guaranteed by the First Amendment-a right which stems
from the role of the judiciary as a coordinate branch of government
and finds clear recognition in recent decisions of the Supreme Court.
III. A First Amendment Right of Access
A. Historical and Theoretical Bases of the Right to Petition
Historically, the right to petition dates back to the Magna Carta"0
and the Declaration of Rights of 1689. 31 The right was reiterated in
1789 when Madison offered his proposed amendments to the Consti-
tution. Although Madison's early draft included the right to apply
"to the legislature by petition"32 and congressional debate focused on
access to elected representatives,3 3 in the final version the right to
petition was extended to the entire "Government." Unfortunately,
there is no record of the significance of the change. Yet, given the co-
equal nature of the branches of American government, it seems reason-
able to conclude that the framers intended access to all brandies.
In a tripartite system of government, any meaningful right to peti-
tion must extend to the judiciary. First, the Constitution allocates to
the judiciary the right to nullify legislation that conflicts with the
Constitution. Thus, the judicial process is a necessary element in
redressing grievances arising from legislative action. Second, the judi-
cial process serves in its broadest sense as a forum for the expression
30. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERS 21 (R. Perry ed. 1959). Although the right to petition
the King was accorded only to barons in the Magna Carta, subsequent development
extended it to all subjects. Id. at 229-30.
31. The Bill of Rights of 1689 provided "[t]hat it is the right of the subjects to
petition the king and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal."
SELEcT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CoNSrrTIoNAL HISTORY 464 (G. Adams & H. Ste phens
ed. 1902). See A. POLLARD, THE EvOLUTION OF PARLiMENT 329-31 (2d ed. rev. 1926).
32. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1834).
33. Madison, for example, stated:
[T]he people have a right to express and communicate their sentiments and wishes.
... The right of freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is expressly
declared to be beyond the reach of this Government; the people may therefore
publicly address their representatives [, may privately advise them, or declare
their sentiments by petition to the whole body; in all these ways they may communi-
cate their will.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (1834).
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of political and social dissatisfaction. A right to petition permits the
courts to consider discontent with legislative enactments and to serve
as an arena for emphasizing the need for further legislation. A third
function of the right to petition is to invoke the law-making power
of the courts: Clearly the redress of grievances is accomplished not
only through legislative enactment, but by judge-made law as well.
Finally, when either the legislature or the judiciary acts to redress
grievances, the rights so established may be enforceable only by the
courts.
34
B. The Supreme Court and First Amendment Access
It is only in the past decade that the Supreme Court has focused
significant attention on the right to petition.35 Interestingly, much of
the recent doctrinal development has involved access to the courts.
The Court first suggested a broad First Amendment right to litigate
in NAACP v. Button,30 a decision upholding the right of the NAACP
to refer individuals to an attorney. The Court held that:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique
of resolving private differences; it is the means for achieving the
lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, fed-
eral, state and local, for the members of the Negro community
in this country. It is thus a form of political expression. Groups
which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through
the ballot frequently turn to the courts. . . . And under the con-
ditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole
practical avenue open to a minority to petition for a redress of
grievances.
3 7
34. Recognition of a fundamental right of access need not affect such concepts as
standing, ripeness, mootness, or exhaustion of remedies. In the federal courts, these are
judicially constructed principles derived from the Article III, § 2 requirement of a case
or controversy. And although many state constitutions do not include similar provisions,
state courts have employed these doctrines as a reasonable means for adjudicating only
those claims which are fit for resolution. Such limitations on the right to petition the
courts are analogous to similar restrictions on the right of legislative petition, such as
the limitations on congressional hearings for rivate citizens.
35. But see United States v. Harrss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. Rtncly,
345 U.S. 41 (1953).
36. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
37. Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added). Even Justice Harlan, who vigorously dissented
on the facts of the case, was adamant in his support of the First Amendment right:
Freedom of expression embraces more than the right of an individual to speak lhis
mind. It includes also his right to advocate and his right to join with his fellows
in an effort to make that advocacy effective . . . . And just as it includes the right
jointly to petition the legislature for redress of grievances, . . . so it must include
the right to join together for purposes of obtaining judicial redress. 'Vc have passed
the point where litigation is regarded as an evil that must be avoided if some ac-
commodation short of a lawsuit can possibly be worked out. Litigation is often
the desirable and orderly way of resolving disputes of broad public significance,
and of obtaining vindication of fundamental rights.
Id. at 452-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The Button opinion is, however, cloudy on certain critical doctri-
nal issues. The Court did not distinguish between the right to petition
and the related First Amendment rights of expression and association 38
Similarly, it is not clear whether the Court was protecting the right
to advocate litigation, to associate for the purpose of litigating, or to
litigate itself.30 Finally, even if Button is read as protecting the right
to litigate, that right may nevertheless be confined to the "vindication
of constitutional rights."
40
In three subsequent cases dealing with the rights of unions to assist
members in Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) suits,4 1 the Court
has given additional substance to the First Amendment right of access.
In upholding, in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar,42 the right of a union to advise its members on the
choice of an attorney, the Court continued to rely on all three First
Amendment rights-speech, assembly, and petition. However, it spe-
cifically stated that the First Amendment protected not only the right
of union members "to assist and advise each other" 3 but also the
"right to petition the courts."414 This access right emerges with even
greater clarity in the most recent FELA case, United Transportation
Union v. State Bar of Miichigan, where the Court stated that "[c]ol-
lective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts
is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amend-
ment."-46 Moreover, by upholding such rights in the context of FELA
suits, these decisions rebut any suggestion that the right of access is
limited to constitutional litigation.
47
38. See id. at 428, 430.
39. Thus, at one point the Court speaks of the extension of First Amendment protection
to "vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion." Id. at
429. At another, it states that "association for litigation may be the most effective form
of political association." id. at 431. And, at yet a third, the opinion speaks simply of
"resort to the courts." Id. at 443.
40. Id. at 443.
41. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex reL. Virginia State Bar, 377 US. 1
(1964); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); United
Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 US. 576 (1970). These cases, like Button,
all involved attempts by the state to regulate access by laws prohibiting barratry and
solicitation.
42. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
43. Id. at 6.
44. The State can no more keep these workers from using their cooperative plan
to advise one another than it could use more direct means to bar them from resorting
to the courts to vindicate their legal rights. The right to petition the courts cannot be
so handicapped.
Id. at 7.
45. 401 US. 576 (1970).
46. Id. at 585.
47. The dissenters in Trainmen insisted that the case was not controlled by Button
as the latter protected only "political expression" desigued "to secure, through court
action, constitutionally protected rights." 379 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting). Al-
though the majority opinion did not explicitly reject this position, it did so implicitly
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The Court's perception of the access right in both Button and the
FELA cases is still clouded, however, by its invocation of the "right
to associate." Yet it seems untenable to read these cases for the propo-
sition that groups, but not individuals, have a First Amendment right
of access. In each case, the association was merely the vehicle for assert-
ing individual claims.48
The Court's use of the Free Speech Clause in these cases also seems
gratuitous. To be sure, various aspects of litigation can be characterized
as speech. Yet the interest involved in each of the cases is access to the
judicial process, a right most clearly perceived as an aspect of the right
to petition-a particular form of expressive conduct accorded specific
protection under the First Amendment.
These doctrinal ambiguities have been largely resolved in California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,4 where the Court, while
warning that instigating "sham" litigation to harass a competitor could
be grounds for an antitrust action, ° strongly affirmed the general
First Amendment right of access. Significantly, the Trucking Un-
limited Court did not rely on the Free Speech or Assembly Clauses;
rather the Court found it sufficient to state that "the right to petition
extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to
the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right to petition.","
In these right-of-access decisions the Court has applied a demanding
test to governmental restrictions on the First Amendment. The general
standard, set forth in Button, is that "only a compelling state interest
in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power
to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms."52 Al-
holding that FELA rights were of sufficient importance to warrant protecting the union's
activity. In the second FELA case, United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967), the Court specifically stated:
We think that both the Button and Trainmen cases are controlling here. The
litigation in question is, of course, not bound up with political matters of acute
social moment, as in Button, but the First Amendment does not protect speech
and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political. 'Great secular
causes, with small ones, are guarded. The grievances for redress of which the right
of petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly, are not solely religious
or political ones." . . . Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
48. Thus, the very purpose of protecting the union's right to provide legal services
in the FELA cases was to assure that individuals could obtain tort judgments under the
FELA.
49. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
50. Id. at 511.
51. Id. at 510.
52. 371 U.S. at 438. The Court also indicated that the state must show a "substantial
regulatory interest" designed to prevent "substantive evils" before the access right may
be restricted. Id. at 444. This latter language might be taken to suggest an alternative,
and less protective, standard. Yet the Court has recently reaffirmed that First Amend-
ment rights are ones "that the Court has come to regard as fundamental and that demand
1062
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though the FELA cases do not explicitly invoke this standard, "3 the
Court's emphasis on the "most precious" nature of the access right&'
and its refusal to countenance even "indirect resthraints"35 suggest that
it will require a substantial governmental interest before permitting
such regulation."o
IV. Access Rights for Indigents
A. Access Rights under the First Amendment
Expenses such as filing fees, security bonds, attorneys' fees, and
notice or discovery costs may be an insuperable obstacle to access for
the poor. Where this is the case, the constitutionality of such expenses
comes into question under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
has addressed this issue only once, in Ortwein v. Schwab,az where it
the lofty requirement of a compelling governmental interest before the)" may be sig-
nificantly regulated." United States v. Kras. 93 S. Ct. 631, 638 (1973), discussed at pp. 106.
57 supra. See also Williams v. Rhodes. 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
53. Like Button, however, the FELA cases do hold that a state ina) not apply its
barratry laws in a manner that restricts First Amendment rights. United Transp. Union
v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 580 (1971); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 225 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6.7 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963).
54. United M ine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 US. 217, 222 (1967).
55. Id.; accord, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. \imginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
The Court has also applied an exacting standard in two antitrust cases invohing the
right to petition. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972);
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
In Nocrr, the Court held that the defendant's activity constituted a petition of the legis-
lature, and consequently was immune from suit under the Shernan Act. Tie Court
indicated, however, that where the petition was a "mere shan" it would not be immune.
365 U.S. at 144. The Court gave content to this test when it held, in Trucking Unlimited,
that a litigant's harassing suits against its competitors could fall within the exception.
Significantly, the Court gave the "sham" exception a narrow reading, suggesting that
it applies only when suspect litigation has the effect of defeating a competitor's right
of "'free and unlimited access' to the agencies and cotrts." 104 U.S. at 515. Of course.
if the Court meant that merely compelling an opponent to commit his resources through
extensive litigation is sufficient to amount to a denial of his right of access, then thc
".shan" exception would be extremely broad. However, the Court found this effect in
the context of massive activity before agencies (and the courts on appeal), where actual
blockage of an opponent's access was quite conceivable because of limited agency re-
sources. See id. The Court's interpretation of the "shant" exception to the First Amend-
ment access right would, therefore, appear to be quite narrow, since actual frustration
of an opponent's access to trial courts (given their greater resources) is unlikely.
But see United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625-26 (193.1), and United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1953) (applying an ambiguous but arguably less protectise
standard under the First Amendment right to petition). See note 70 infra.
56. In other contexts the Court has used an ad hoc balancing approach which is
not so heavily weighted in favor of the First Amendment and which produces seemingly
conflicting results. See T. E.ERsox, Tut Svsrr_%t oF FmrEEo.t OF ExtmtRssmoN 717-18 (1970).
A comparison of the Court's attempts to resolve the doctrinal issues in cases dealing
with public demonstrations illustrates this lack of coherence. Compare Amalgamated
Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), with Walker
v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 316 (1967), and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965.
57. 41 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. March 5, 1973).
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was presented with the contention that the right to petition required
the waiver of a filing fee for indigents in appeals from welfare hearings.
In a brief footnote to its per curiam opinion, the Court stated that
appellants' First Amendment rights were "fully satisfied" by the initial
hearing.5 8Thus, the Court seems to feel that the First Amendment
does not establish an access right on the appellate level. However, the
Court noted that the initial hearing provided "a procedure, not con-
ditioned on payment of any fee, through which appellants have been
able to seek redress."' 9 From this statement it might be inferred that
the First Amendment does secure a right of access to the initial hear.
ing unburdened by governmentally-imposed costs. Unfortunately, the
Court did not discuss the rationale for, or the implications of, its state-
ments, nor did it discuss the existing precedent concerning the right to
petition. Thus the scope of an indigent's First Amendment rights at
the trial level, and, in light of the cursory treatment given in Ortwein
v. Schwab, 0 arguably also at the appellate level,01 remains open to
further inquiry.
1. Filing Fees
Filing fees may be justified on three grounds: cost recoupment, de-
terrence of unmeritorious litigation, and resource allocation. On ex-
amination, however, none of these rationales appears sufficiently com-
pelling to justify abridgment of the First Amendment rights of indigent
plaintiffs.0
2
Although filing fees are a source of revenue, they presently recoup
only a fraction of the cost of operating the courts; most judicial systems
are largely tax subsidized. 3 Waiving such fees for indigents should thus
58. Id. at 3474 n.5.
59. Id. at 8474.
60. The case was decided without benefit of either full briefs or oral argument. Id. at
3474 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. For First Amendment purposes, it seems difficult to justify a distinction between
initial and appellate hearings. The right to petition for the redress of grievances may
well require access to the appellate level where it is necessary to obtain relief.
62. In a series of cases the Court has invalidated licensing taxes in the free speech
and free press areas. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (licensing tax
on newspapers invalid as a prior restraint); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111
(1943) ("Freedom of the press, and freedom of religion are available to all, not merely
to those who can pay their own way.'); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944). How.
ever, in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), the Court sustained a permit fee
for the right to parade. Whether Cox is still authoritative is doubtful. In any case, the
distinction between licensing taxes and permit fees suggested in Cox is difficult to
justify. See T. EMERSON, supra note 56, at 310-11.
63. For example, in New York State only about eleven million dollars in an overall
budget of $255 million (both criminal and civil) were derived from filing fees in fiscal
1971. Although precise figures are unavailable, it appears that approximately forty per-
cent of the total budget is allocated to civil cases, and thus filing fees provide about
1064
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have little effect on the financial status of the courts. The interest in
preserving the fisc to this small extent would hardly appear to be "com-
pelling."
Moreover, though filing fees may advance the legitimate goal of de-
terring unmeritorious litigation, their value for this purpose is ques-
tionable. The fee may deter only the poor from bringing unmeritorious
suits; more prosperous litigants may willingly pay nominal fees to bring
even frivolous actions. More importantly, the fees may simultaneously
discourage the poor from pursuing meritorious litigation. Where, as
here, unnecessarily broad regulatory measures interfere with First
Amendment rights, a less drastic means is clearly in order.04 Simple
dismissal for failure to state a claim seems an adequate means of avoid-
ing unmeritorious litigation, yet one which would not interfere with
an indigent's legitimate right of access.
Finally, it may be argued that the government has an interest in allo-
cating scarce judicial resources as efficiently as possible, and that re-
quiring the litigant to bear at least part of the court costs may serve
this end. If a plaintiff does not feel that the expected value of the
judgment he seeks (discounted by his chance of recovering no judg-
ment at all) exceeds even the fraction of actual court costs represented
by the filing fee, then arguably his case is not worth trying. When
applied to the poor, however, this argument is less than convincing.
An indigent might well find himself without sufficient liquid resources
to pay the fee, even though the reasonably expected value of the judg-
ment he seeks is substantially larger. Moreover, it is incorrect to view
the allocative problem merely in terms of the judgment to be awarded
the plaintiff. Even suits that yield small judgments may serve signifi-
ten percent of the total revenues for dvil courts. Telephone interview with N. O'Brien,
Assistant Supervisor, Budget Division, Judicial Conference of the State of New? York,
Feb. 26, 1973.
In Connecticut $1.5 million in a total budget of $22" million were derived from the
entry fee for fiscal 1971. Telephone interview with E. Criscuolo, Chief Accountant, Ju-
dicial Department, State of Connecticut, Feb. 23, 1973. Assuming that Connecticut's
civil caseload is proportional to that of New York, fees account for roughly seventeen
percent of the civil court revenues.
But see United States v. Kras, 93 S. Ct. 631, 639 (1973) (fees in bankruptcy designed to
make system "self-sufficient').
64. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Wormuth &
M.irkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAhi L. REV. 254, 267-93 (1964).
But see Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
An alternative less drastic means of deterring frivolous suits might be a more effi-
cient (and hence more justifiable) fee system, perhaps based on a progressive, sliding
scale related to either the amount of the claim or the income of the claimant. Such a
progressive system of allocating the costs of litigation could also be applied to notice,
security, or attorney expenses. Of course, some individuals may be so destitute that even
a sliding fee schedule would not operate effectively; waiver would then be required.
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cant precedential or deterrent functions." Finally, the application of
such narrow efficiency norms may have the effect of barring the poor
as a class from enforcing many valid claims, simply because those
claims are likely to be comparatively small. The result may be not
only considerable individual hardship, G but diminished respect for
the law as well.
There is precedent as well as reason to support the conclusion that
the government's interest in filing fees is insufficiently compelling to
warrant an abridgment of the access rights of indigents. In Boddie,
the Court explicitly rejected resource allocation and cost recoupment
as justifications for fees that interfered with the due process right of
access. 7 And in Lindsey v. Normet, the Court similarly rejected the
argument that a double bond could be justified as a deterrent to un-
meritorious appeals. 8 Finally, the legislatures of approximately half
the states, by enacting in forma pauperis statutes, have indicated that in
their judgment the right of access outweighs any state interest in filing
fees.0 9
2. Attorneys' Fees
It is less clear that the right to petition requires the government to
cover attorneys' fees or related costs, such as those involved in discov-
65. This is particularly true in consumer class actions, in which one victory In a
theoretically trivial action can affect the practices of an entire industry. See, e.g., Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Moreover, such actions may be important in using the courts as means of allocating
the risks and benefits of a variety of social transactions. It is obvious that one who
creates social costs, whether intentionally or through mere negligence, will have no
incentive to avoid such costs if he knows he will not, as a practical matter, be called
upon to answer for them in court. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE CosTs ov ACcIDENTS
73-75 (1970).
66. Even if there are cases in which limitations on access rights can be justified on
grounds of allocative efficiency, the state may be required to mitigate the resulting
hardship to frustrated plaintiffs by compensating them for the claims they forego. See
note 90 infra.
67. We are thus left to evaluate the State's asserted interest in its fee and cost
requirements as a mechanism of resource allocation or cost recoupment. Such I
justification was offered and rejected in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In
Griffin it was the requirement of a transcript beyond the means of the indigent
that blocked access to the judicial process. While in Griffin the transcript could be
waived as a convenient but not necessary predicate to the court access, here the
State invariably imposes the costs as a measure of allocating its judicial resources.
Surely, then, the rationale of Griffin covers this case.
401 U.S. at 382. Cf. Ortwein v. Schwab, 41 U.S.L.V. 3473, 3474 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1973),
where the Court found that the fee system was a rational means of cost recoupment.
Since the Court found no right of access, it did not address the question of whether
such an interest was compelling.
68. The claim that the double-bond requirement operates to screen out frivolous
appeals is unpersuasive, for it not only bars non-frivolous appeals by those who are
unable to post the bond but also allows meritless appeals by others who can afford
the bond.
405 U.S. at 78.
69. See Silverstein, supra note 1, at 33-36.
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ery. Strictly speaking, such expenditures are not court-imposed, nor
are they essential in gaining access to the courts. Moreover, the parallel
to the legislative petition is suggestive, for though a fee on petitions
themselves or on the act of lobbying might be suspect, 0 the govern-
ment clearly need not pay the salaries of lobbyists or provide transpor-
tation for citizens who wish to address their representatives."
Still, one might argue that the right to petition is really the right
to make an "effective" petition, and that, given the importance of legal
assistance, this requires the government to reimburse indigents for
attorney or discovery expenses. The Supreme Court has taken an
analogous position with respect to the rights of criminal defendants
under the Due Process Clause-.7 2 Yet, while there is one brief reference
to "meaningful access" in its United Transportation Union decision,7
there is at present little other authority for the proposition that the
First Amendment places such an affirmative duty on the state."
3. Notice Costs
Courts considering class actions will generally order notice to absent
members of the class to inform them of the action and of their right
to withdraw from it.J Such costs, like attorneys' fees, are paid not to
the court but to third parties (usually newspapers or the postal sys-
tem). Yet, unlike attorneys' fees, notice expenses are non-discretionary.
The inability to pay such costs, which are often substantial,70 may
result in the dismissal of the suit as a class action, despite the fact that
70. Interestingly, several states currently impose registration fees on paid lobb)ists.
See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 2-45 (Supp. 1969) (thirty-fivc dollar fee); INo. ANN.
STAT. § 34-307 (1969) (two dollar fee). Although there is no indication that these statutes
have yet been subjected, to attack, their constitutionality seems questionable.
Registration and disclosure provisions-without any fee-have been upheld in the
case of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1970). In United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the Court sustained the Act after gihing it a narrou,
construction which imposed its requirements only on "direct communication" to Con-
gressmen. Id. at 623. The test used in sustaining this aspect of the Act is unclear, although
it appears to have been an ad hoc balancing approach. See id. at 625. General disclosure
and registration provisions, however, have been sharply criticized. T. Etraso. supra note
56, at 640. In any case, the requirement of registration does not work the same pre-
clusive effect as do monetary barriers for the poor.
71. Arguments in favor of a right to counsel and to pa)ment of discoiery costs might
more easily be made under the Due Process Clause, which regulates the incidents of a
hearing. See Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YA.LE L.J. 545,
558-59 (1967); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 CoM. L. REv. 1322,
1329-33 (1966).
72. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See cases cited in note 21 supra.
73. 401 U.S. at 585.
74. See generally T. E. nrsoN, supra note 56, at 648.53.
75. See, e.g., FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
76. For example, in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (a
truth-in-lending case), the cost of notice was estimated at .37,500. 3B J. MoorE, FEDE AL
PRAcaeE 23.55, at 61 (Supp. 1972).
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the individual claims may be meritorious. In theory, the individuals
thus barred from pursuing their claims through a class action are not
denied access to the courts completely, since they may sue as individ-
uals. In reality, however, it is highly unlikely that class members will
sue on their own behalf, either because they are ignorant of their rights
or because they are unable to pay the costs involved in bringing an
individual action. Thus, a strong right-of-access case can be made for
requiring the government to defray all or part of the costs of notice
where such costs exceed the plaintiff's resources.7 7 In fact, since the
class action serves as an efficient mechanism for avoiding the wasted
effort of adjudicating a large number of identical cases, it would appear
to be in the financial interest of the state, as well as of the potential
plaintiffs, to facilitate such suits as a matter of sound judicial policy.
4. Security Bond Expenses
Under certain circumstances, a court may require that the plaintiff 8
post some security before proceeding with an action. 9 As with notice
requirements imposed to protect the rights of others, it may be argued
that the court must relieve the plaintiff of such costs when there is no
other way to effectuate his First Amendment right of access. 80 Where
waiver of the security requirement would clearly infringe upon the
interests of the defendant, the court could either provide the premium
necessary for a bond or act as surety itself.81 To be sure, the latter ap-
77. Payment of notice costs may entail a greater financial burden for the state than
waiver of the filing fee. However, the cost of this notice to the state may be minimized
by ordering notice that is less costly than first-class mail notice but that still gives ade-
quate notification of the suit. See, e.g., Doglow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 498 (E.D.N.Y.
1968); Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465, 472 (N.D. Ill. 1967). More-
over, the court may apportion the cost between plaintiff and defendant at a pretrial
hearing in order to effectuate due process and avoid cost to the government. See Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (defendant ordered to prepay
ninety percent of notice costs).
78. The text focuses on the rights of plaintiffs, as opposed to defendants, for two
reasons. First, it is to plaintiffs that the right to "petition" most obviously and naturally
extends. Second, the rights of defendants have already been elaborated under the Due
Process Clause, and it seems unlikely that the First Amendment right to petition would
add to them substantially.
However, it might well be argued that confining a right of access to just one of the
parties to a lawsuit is highly artificial. Moreover, the Due Process Clause has yet to
be interpreted to require that the court meet the costs of posting security in cases
where the defendant is indigent.
79. Most states have a number of security requirements for plaintiffs. See, e.g., N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. §§ 6312(b) (injunction), 5519 (appeals) (McKinney 1963); N.Y. Civ. PaAc.
§ 8503 (McKinney Supp. 1972) (costs).
80. A due process rationale for waiver of certain types of bonds may be found in
Note, Indigent Access to Civil Courts, supra note 3, at 59-64. See also Williams v. Shaffer,
222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1037, 1039 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
& Warren, C.J., dissenting), supra note 26.
81. It may be more economical for the state to act as surety itself, since the costs
of providing security are internalized, thus eliminating the necessity of providing it
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proach could lead to situations where the state would have to pursue
the indigent plaintiff for repayment. But if the state finds that the
benefits of such security arrangements are substantial (and many states
do not), 2 then this inconvenience may merely be the price it must pay
to protect the First Amendment rights of its citizens.
B. Access Rights under the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause
The preceding discussion has focused exclusively on the First Amend-
ment rights of indigents. Alternatively, access barriers might be chal-
lenged on equal protection grounds. There seems little question that
First Amendment rights are "fundamental" interests which, under cur-
rent doctrine, cannot be regulated on the basis of a "suspect" classifi-
cation without some compelling state interest.8 3 Yet, while the Court
has on occasion voided state measures that condition the enjoyment
of fundamental rights on an individual's wealth, 8' several recent de-
cisions suggest that the present Court is not receptive to the view that
wealth is a suspect classification.8
Moreover, it is not clear that the relief mandated under such a theory
would extend any further than that required by the First Amend-
ment alone. The standard applied by the Court in the right-to-
petition cases 6 appears just as strict as the "compelling state in-
terest" standard required under the Equal Protection Clause.87 Thus,
while the combination of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
provides a powerful argument which the courts must consider in the
case of indigent plaintiffs, suspect classification analysis may not be
necessary where, as here, the fundamental interest at stake is itself
of constitutional proportions.88
bondsman with a profit. If, however, the judiciary relied upon private bondsmen, there
might well be instances where the indigent was so destitute that no bond would issue
because of the high risk of nonpayment. Arguably the state should post security in such
cases.
82. See Note, Indigent Access to Civil Courts, supra note 3, at 29.
83. See Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 US. 92 (1972); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 US. 268 (1951).
Current equal protection doctrine is surveyed in Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1132 (1969).
84. See note 21 supra.
85. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970). But see Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
86. See pp. 1062-63 supra.
87. See, e.g.,.Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
88. On those occasions on which it has invoked equal protection doctrine in inval-
idating state regulation that touches upon First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court
has in fact been quite ambiguous as to whether its holding could be reached on First
Amendment grounds alone. See Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 403 U.S.
92 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 US. 23, 30-31 (1968); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
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V. Toward a First Amendment Right of Access for the Non-Poor
The discussion thus far has considered the First Amendment right
of access only as it extends to the poor. Yet governmentally-imposed
costs of litigation may also abridge the access rights of more pros-
perous citizens.
To be sure, the governmental interest in raising revenues, deterring
unmeritorious suits, and allocating judicial resources seems more com-
pelling once the plaintiff can at least meet the costs of litigation. Such
considerations evidently discouraged the Court in Griffin v. Illinois9
from going further than requiring relief for indigents from financial
barriers to an effective criminal defense. A similar approach may be
appropriate in effectuating the First Amendment right of access.00
But if, as argued here, the right to litigate is protected by the First
Amendment even apart from any suspect classification analysis, then
the state may lack sufficient justification for regulating the access
rights of any citizen, rich or poor. Thus, in Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections9' the Court struck down a poll tax as applied to all citizens,
U.S. 268, 272-73 (1951).
Of course, there may well be situations in which equal protection doctrine would
have wider ramifications than the First Amendment right alone. Thus, suspect classifi-
cation analysis in conjunction with the fundamental right of access may call into ques-
tion the validity of jurisdictional amount requirements, such as those commonly applied
in the federal courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1335, 1346(a) (1970). These imi-
tations are not mandated by the Constitution, but arguably fall within the scope of
Congress' power to establish lower federal courts under Article III, § 2. See Sheldon v.
Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850); Turner v. Bank of North-America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)
8 (1799). It could well be argued, however, that these restrictions on the jurisdiction of
the courts establish a de facto wealth classification. Although such requirements are
not tied directly to the litigant's wealth, but rather to the size of his claim, it is likely
that their impact falls most heavily upon the indigent.
Jurisdictional amount requirements, of course, do not generally operate to bar liti-
gation entirely, but only to limit the choice of forum. Nevertheless, this limitation may
disadvantage the plaintiff sufficiently to amount to an infringement of the access right.
The jurisdictional amount requirements may be defended as serving a compelling
state interest in resource allocation; removal of the restriction could lead to long delays
and inefficient handling of claims. Whether a jurisdictional amount requirement Is a
reasonable means of serving this end, however, is open to question. Aiain, a less drastic
means of regulating case load, such as a jurisdictional amount requirement geared to
the plaintiff's wealth, might well be available. See note 64 supra.
89. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See cases cited in note 21 supra.
90. Even if resource allocation-in this case certainly the strongest of the state's
interests-should be deemed sufficiently compelling to justify limitations on the right
of access, the First Amendment would require that the state take the least drastic mens
of pursuing its efficiency goals. See note 64 supra. Thus, if the state chooses to bar liti-
gation, whether through fees or otherwise, where the costs of adjudication will exceed
the value of the judgment, it may be required to reimburse the plaintiff for the claim
he foregoes. An analogous approach can be found in the movement toward no.fault
automobile accident compensation schemes, which typically deprive Individuals of their
right to an action on the grounds that the litigation involved is an Inefficient means of
allocating social costs and benefits, yet at the same time provide an alternative means
of compensating victims. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-319 to 351a (Supp. 197).
91. 883 U.S. 663 (1966).
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rather than simply requiring waiver of the tax for the poor. 2 Though
the rationale of Harper is less than clear, the Court emphasized the
critical importance of voting as a right "'preservative of all rights,' "3
and may have felt that, given this vital interest, the inhibiting effect of
even a nominal fee could not be tolerated. Similar reasoning might
well be invoked to require the invalidation of all court-imposed costs
of litigation, regardless of the plaintiff's financial condition.
VI. Conclusion
The First Amendment right to petition provides a more secure and
comprehensible foundation for a right of judicial access than does the
due process approach of Boddie. The First Amendment right is inde-
pendent of the nature of the interest at stake in the litigation; further-
more, unlike the Due Process Clause, the right to petition quite nat-
urally encompasses the rights of plaintiffs. Thus, the First Amendment
firmly anchors the access right in a specific constitutional safeguard
that places a heavy burden of justification upon any governmental
restriction. The cursory and ambiguous treatment of the First Amend-
ment in Ortwein is clearly inadequate; the right to petition merits
more careful consideration.
92. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 US. 134 (1972) (striking down filing fees for candidates
in state primaries as a violation of equal protection).
93. 383 U.S. at 667, quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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